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mE SUPREME COURT & CONSTITUTIONAL
mEORY, 1953-1993. By Ronald Kahn.t Lawrence, KS.:
University Press of Kansas. 1994. x+ 316 pp. $35.00
Daniel Krislov2
In this book, Professor Kahn attempts to explain the decisionmaking processes of the Supreme Court of the United States.
In doing so, he attempts to discredit what he terms the "instrumental" approaches to understanding these processes, and instead postulates that the Court takes a "constitutive approach" in
its decisionmaking. Unfortunately, Kahn's arguments lack substance, and therefore fail to convince at least this reader that he
is on to something.
Kahn identifies four different "instrumental" approaches.
The first of these he terms the "election returns" approach. This
is most strongly identified with political scientist Robert Dahl.3
This approach views the Court as being a political institution with
decisionmaking processes "not significantly different" from those
of the elective branches of government and their appointees. 4
Justices are, according to Kahn's version of this view, concerned
with the making of policy choices, and principles of natural and
fundamental rights do not play a significant role in decisionmaking.s Dahl believes that the Court follows the policymaking preferences of the majority of the electorate, and serves primarily to
legitimize the majority coalition's interpretation of the Constitution.6 Views held by the Court that are contrary to those held by
the majority coalition will, after some lag time, change so as to
become aligned with the majority while the president, with the
advice and consent of Congress, alters the Court through the appointments process.7 In Dahl's view, it is the majority coalition,
which itself consists of a collection of minority groups, that can
be the effective guarantor of rights in the American system. Natural and fundamental rights, precedent, and legal doctrines are
1. Professor of Politics, Oberlin College.
2. J.D. Stanford Law School, 1994. Graduate Student, Department of Jurisprudence & Social Policy, University of California at Berkeley.
3. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Coun
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. Law 279 (1957).
4. P. 7.
5. Id.
6. P. 8.
7. ld.
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merely the tools the Court uses in legitimizing the majority coalition's vision of society.s
The second "instrumental approach" identified by Kahn is
the "policymaking approach" most strongly associated with political scientist Martin Shapiro.9 Like Dahl, Shapiro sees the Court
as a political policymaking institution, in which the decisions of
the Court reflect the policy preferences of the Justices rather
than legal precedent and rules.lo Unlike Dahl, however, Shapiro
sees the Court as having significant independent policymaking
ability. Thus, the Court is able to decide whether to embark in
new policy directions in the absence of strong support or pressure from interest groups or the elective branches of government.
Shapiro argues that the Court's authority stems from its ability to
react to diffuse but strong public support for constitutional values
such as free speech.H
The third "instrumental approach" is the "safety valve approach." Adherents of this view, such as Anthony Lewistz and
Archibald Cox,t3 believe that the Court serves to ensure the
proper functioning of the pluralist political system. This view accepts Dahl's view of the equilibrium of the pluralist majority coalition as the protector of individual rights, but also holds that the
Court has a necessary role in the maintenance of the systemi.e., that of counteracting the malfunctions of state and federal
political institutions.14 In this view, the Court and the law must
be autonomous from the political branches of government.
The fourth "instrumental approach" is the "biographical approach."ts This approach views the Justices' decisionmaking
processes as being determined by their own polity and rights
principles, and these principles are, in tum, determined by the
Justices' biographical experiences. Legal debate amongst the
Justices is not, in this view, the "epiphenomenal" cover for policy
compromises, but is instead vital to the Justices' decisionmaking
processes.16
8. Pp. 7-8.
9. See, e.g., Martin M. Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court: New Approaches to Political Jurisprudence (Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).
10. P. 10.
11. P. 13.
12. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Earl Warren, in Richard H. Sayler, Barry B. Boyer,
and Robert E. Gooding, Jr., eds., The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis (Chelsea House,
1969).
13. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government (Oxford U. Press, 1976).
14. P. 15.
15. Pp. 15-18.
16. P. 16.
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Kahn criticizes these approaches as providing inadequate
pictures of the decisionmaking processes. He argues that the
"election returns" approach lacks empirical proofp and that it
uncritically accepts the outcomes of the pluralist process, failing
to see that structural inequities may lead to unfairness in the outcomes of the political process.ts Thus, according to Kahn, seeing
the Court as being within the political process does not allow it to
correct these structural inequities.
Kahn goes on to criticize the policymaking approach as failing to provide any normative basis for judging the quality of the
Justice's decisions, as "Shapiro's argument ... leads to the conclusion that no constitutional or moral theory is better than any
other."t9 He also accuses this approach of "trivializing" the role
of academics and "polity and rights" principles in influencing the
Justices' decisions.zo As we shall see, much of the remainder of
this book is a futile attempt to refute Shapiro's view that the Justices pay significant attention to the academics only when their
conclusions support the outcome that the Justices prefer.
The "safety valve" approach is criticized as focusing too narrowly on one value-keeping the pluralist political system
open.21 Like the election returns and policymaking approaches,
the safety valve approach uncritically accepts a well-functioning
pluralist system as a good thing, but it envisions a greater role for
the Court in maintaining such a system. There is, according to
Kahn, however, no place for "deep separation of powers, Tenth
Amendment, Federalist no. 10, Reconstruction amendments, or
other foundational principles" in this approach.22 Funny, but I
would have thought that the "right" to an open political process
was itself a "foundational principle."
The biographical approach, according to Kahn, recognizes
the importance of principles in shaping the opinions of the Justices.23 It does not, however, recognize law as being independent
of politics, as the life experiences of the judges affect the way in
which they interpret the principles involved. The judges, in other
words, are the medium through which the larger culture influences the interpretation of law.z4
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Pp. 53-55.
Pp. 75-76.
P. 96.
Pp. 97-98.
Pp. 77-78.
P. 78.
P. 16.
Pp. 16-18.
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Kahn believes that the fault that all of these approaches
share is their failure to recognize the rule of law as autonomous
from politics. He believes that there is a need for a new model
that recognizes this. Thus, Kahn proposes a "constitutive approach" in which the Justices' views on "polity and rights" principles interact with the views presented by the "interpretive
community."25 Polity principles are those that are concerned
with the proper role of the Court and other institutions in the
American constitutional order ,26 while rights principles concern
the fundamental rights that should be afforded individuals and,
perhaps, groups.27 The interpretive community consists of academic commentators, law professors, political theorists, and
political scientists who write about the work of the courts.28
Thus, these principles are more important than policy concerns,
and the interpretive community is more important than political
actors in shaping the actions of the Court.
Kahn offers no strong evidence for the primacy of rights and
polity principles. Rather, he simply asserts the mention of these
principles in a particular opinion indicates that this was the factor
that determined the case (a ploy he uses several times throughout the book). Unfortunately, this does not demonstrate anything of the kind. Shapiro and the other "policymaking"
theorists do not assert that rights and polity principles play no
role in the Court's opinions, but rather that they are used to justify the policy decisions at which the Court arrives. Kahn makes
no serious attempt to explain how he can empirically demonstrate the "true" motivations of the Court, but that does not stop
him from making assertions about what that motivation is.
Much of Kahn's book is dedicated to demonstrating how the
constitutive approach helps to understand the difference between
the Warren and Burger Courts. He argues that the major difference between the Courts was in their responses to the interpretive community.z9 The Warren Court, according to Kahn,
rejected the complacent polity views of the pluralists such as
Dahl and instead adopted a "critical pluralist" view, which perceived a need for greater amounts of judicial intervention to prevent groups of people, especially blacks and urbanites, from
being locked out of the political system (this belief was behind
the voting and districting cases, as well as the educational deseg25.
26.
27.

Pp. 18-22.
Pp. 20-21.
Pp. 21-22.

28. P. 206.
29.

Pp. 179-81.
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regation cases).30 The Burger Court, on the other hand, accepted
much of the analysis of its contemporary interpretive community,
and its decisions reflected a different view of polity and rights
principles than did that of the Warren Court. The Burger Court
was, according to Kahn, more likely to view rights and polity issues as being embedded in institutional and societal contexts
than was the Warren Court, hence the greater focus on affirmative action and institutional reform by the Burger Court. Thus,
Kahn argues, the "no counterrevolution" view of the Burger
Court, which sees it as an aimless transitional Court,3t is fundamentally wrong. Rather, the Burger Court was responding to its
own vision of the proper constitutional order.32
I find this argument quite thin. Kahn attempts to prove that
the role of the swing Justices has been overstated in the literature, and that this has led to a view that the decisions of the Burger Court were generally unprincipled compromises. He
provides statistics on the religious education cases heard by the
Burger Court in order to prove his assertion, but as far as I can
see, all he succeeds in demonstrating is the pivotal role of Justice
Powell, who was in the majority in all but one of the cases.33 Justice Powell's pivotal role in the affirmative action cases is also
dramatically illustrated by his opinion of the Court in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,34 which received the votes
of the four conservative Justices for the result and the votes of
the four liberal Justices for much of the reasoning. Kahn identifies affirmative action as being at the heart of the Burger Court's
constitutive concerns, and Bakke is clearly the most important
decision handed down by that Court on this issue, yet to argue
that the Bakke result is even coherent seems a daunting intellectual task. Nothing in Kahn's book persuades me to believe that
there is any better way of viewing the Burger Court than as a
policymaking entity with two fundamentally opposed voting
blocs, and a center attempting to build compromises.
Likewise, if one analyzes where the Rehnquist Court has reversed the direction of the Warren and Burger Court precedents,
one finds strong support for the view that the Court is politically
responsive. The Court has for example, not entirely overruled
30. Pp. 65-66.
31. Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't (Yale
U. Press, 1983).
32. P. 138.
33. P. 117.
34. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
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the holding of Roe v. Wade,Js but only modified it somewhat.
Kahn holds this out as an instance of the Court resisting the pressures of the executive branch because of the Court's view of its
own role in the polity as a protector or rights, and of the importance of precedent as a necessary component of institutional integrity.36 There are at least two major reasons to doubt this view.
First, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey37 was handed down during a presidential election campaign in which abortion was a key issue, and the Republican voters were deeply divided over the issue. (Republicans and
Republican-leaning voters were closely divided on the issue of
abortion during the summer of 1992, with 49% supporting and
42% opposed to President Bush's position that abortion should
be legal only in cases of rape, incest, and when the pregnancy
endangered the woman's life.)Js The last thing the Bush reelection campaign would have wanted that year was a decisive opinion overturning Roe, as they were trying to defuse the issue.39
The Casey decision actually closely paralleled public opinion on
the issue, which favored abortion rights with restrictions. 40 Thus,
Casey can easily be viewed as a political compromise. Secondly,
although the plurality opinion goes out of its way to stress the
importance of stare decisis, the decision actually overturns the tri35. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
36. Pp. 256-57.
37. - U.S. - , 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
38. Larry Hugick, 1992 Presidential Campaign: August, Gallup Poll Monthly, August
1992, at 2, 6.
39. Although the 1992 Republican Platform called for a constitutional amendment
banning abortion, the Bush campaign backed away from this position. See, e.g., The President's Measures to Strengthen Families, Bush Campaign Document, August 15, 1992
(available on the internet-gopher tamuts.tamu.edu).
40. A survey by the Gallup Organization taken January 16-19, 1992 showed that
respondents overwhelmingly supported three of the provisions upheld by the Casey decision; 86% favored requirements that a doctor inform patients of alternatives to abortion,
73% favored a 24-hour waiting period before receiving an abortion, and 70% favored a
requirement of parental consent for women under 18. However, 73% also favored arequirement that the husband of a married woman must be notified if she decides to have
an abortion-a requirement that was struck down by the Casey decision. Public Opinion
and Demographic Report, American Enterprise, May/June 1992, at 97, 100. Kahn might
argue that this demonstrates that fealty to equal protection precedent rather than public
opinion was driving the Court's decision on this issue. On the other hand, the Court did
not seem terribly concerned with equal protection when it allowed the requirement for a
24-hour waiting period for a medical procedure that by definition can only be performed
on women. I am not aware of any similar requirement for any other medical procedure in
American law. Since the Court's concern with equal protection seems rather selective, it
thus seems more plausible to argue that the three Justices who joined the plurality opinion were concerned with the practical implications of the spousal notification requirement, particularly the potential physical harm that might occur to some women in this
situation.
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mester framework of Roe, and also overturns subsequent decisions that invalidated restrictions on obtaining abortions (such as
the imposition of a 24-hour waiting period).4t This sounds more
like the acts of a Court trying to justify policy switches rather
than one actually concerned with polity principles.
Kahn's view of the Court's decisionmaking processes seems
something of an academic insider's perspective, overstating the
importance of academics to the process. Certainly, there are reasons to believe that academics do have some influence on the
actions of the Court, particularly in areas that are technical and
command little or no political attention. However, it is hard to
believe that the Justices would listen to someone whose constitutional theories led to conclusions that were opposed to their policy preferences. Likewise, it seems naive to assume that the
academics are also somehow immune to political considerations.
Their policy preferences and the subjects they choose to write
about are also shaped by the culture in which they live. It is very
hard to believe that there are many academics out there forming
theories of constitutional law that lead to conclusions to which
they are personally opposed. In any event, Kahn's description of
the Warren Court's rejection of the interpretive community's
view of pluralism renders his view that the role of the interpretive community is pivotal incoherent. This history, if accurate,
demonstrates that the Court is free to accept or reject the interpretive community's analyses, and the Court can develop its own.
Indeed, Kahn argues that the current Court will probably reject
the theories developed by the currently fashionable civic republican theorists because their writings fail to provide a rationale for
the Court to maintain a role of imposing a critical vision of the
Constitution.4z The question ultimately left open is what actually
affects the Justices' visions of the proper constitutional order.
The answer that Kahn offers is that "the Court makes its choices
[over polity principles and fundamental rights issues] in relationship to the boundaries of the debate within the interpretive community and the wider, informed society," and is "autonomous of
the direct influence of electoral politics and the interpretive community."43 How does Kahn know this, and where do Justices'
choices come from? Readers of this book will have no idea.
41. The Casey decision also overturned aspects of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
42. P. 265.
43. Pp. 262-63.

